I argue that conventional estimates of the criterion for classical behavior of a macroscopic body are incorrect, because they do not take into account the locality of interactions, which characterizes the behavior of all systems described approximately by local quantum field theory. Black holes are the only localized objects which do not have such a description. The deviations from classical behavior of a macroscopic body, except for those which can be described as classical uncertainties in the initial values of macroscopic variables,are exponentially small as a function of the volume of the macro-system in microscopic units.
1 Classical behavior in the non-relativistic quantum mechanics of particles
In standard texts on non-relativistic quantum mechanics the classical limit is described via examples and via the WKB approximation. In particular, one often describes the spreading of the wave packet of a free particle, and estimates it as a function of time and the particle mass M. There is nothing wrong with the mathematics done in these texts, but the implication that these estimates provide the basis for an understanding of why classical mechanics is such a good approximation for macroscopic objects is not correct and therefore misleading. In particular it leads one to conclude that the corrections to decoherence for a wave function describing a superposition of two different macroscopic states is power law in the mass. I would aver that this mistake forms part of the psychological unease that many physicists feel about the resolution of Schrödinger's cat paradox in terms of the concept of decoherence.
In this introductory section, I would like to demonstrate why such estimates are wrong, using standard ideas of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. In the remainder of the paper I will discuss the basis for these calculations in quantum field theory. This will also remove the necessity to resort to HartreeFock like approximations to prove the point directly in the non-relativistic formalism. The essential point of the argument is that we must take into account the fact that a macroscopic object is made out of a huge number > 10 20 of microscopic constituents, in order to truly understand its classical behavior. I will argue that, as a consequence, the overlaps between states where the object follows two macroscopically different trajectories, as well as the matrix elements of all local 1 operators between such states, are of order e −10 20 .
The extraordinary smallness of such double exponentials defeats all of our ordinary intuitions about ordinary physics. In a phrase I learned in graduate school from Kerson Huang, "The number e 10 20 , viewed as a time interval, is essentially the same number when measured in Planck units, as it is when measured in ages of the universe. The two differ by a mere factor of 10 61 .". Over such long time scales, many counter-intuitive things could happen. For example, in a hypothetical classical model of a living organism made of this many constituents, or in a correct quantum model, the phenomenon of Poincare recurrences assures that given (roughly) this much time,the organism could spontaneously self assemble,out of a generic initial state of its constituents.
Consider then, the wave function of such a composite of N ≫ 1 particles, assuming a Hamiltonian of the form
Apart from electromagnetic and gravitational forces, the two body potentials are assumed to be short ranged. We could also add multi-body potentials, as long as the number of particles that interact is ≪ N 2 . The Hamiltonian is Galilean invariant and we can separate it into the kinetic energy of the center of mass, and the Hamiltonian for the body at rest. The wave function is of the form
which is a general function of coordinate differences. We now want to compare this wave function with the internal wave function of the system when the particle is not following a straight, constant velocity trajectory. In order to do this, we introduce an external potential U({x i }). It is extremely important that U is not simply a function of the center of mass coordinate but a sum of terms denoting the interaction of the potential with each of the constituents. This very natural assumption is derivable from local field theory: the external potential must interact locally with "the field that creates a particle at a point". So we assume
where we have allowed for the possibility, e.g. that the external field is electrical and different constituents have different charge. To solve the external potential problem, we write x i = X cm + ∆ i and expand the individual potentials around the center of mass, treating the remaining terms as a small perturbation. We then obtain a Hamiltonian for the center of mass, which has a mass of order N, as well as a potential of order N. The large N limit is then the WKB limit for the center of mass motion. The residual Hamiltonian for the internal wave function has small external potential terms, whose coefficients depend on the center of mass coordinate.
The Schrodinger equation for the center of mass motion thus has solutions which are wave functions concentrated around a classical trajectory X cm (t) of the center of mass, moving in the potential u i (X cm ). These wave functions will spread with time in a way that depends on this potential. For example, initial Gaussian wave packets for a free particle will have a width, which behaves like t/Nm for large t, where m is a microscopic mass scale. The fact that this is only significant when t ∼ N is the conventional explanation for the classical behavior of the center of mass variable.
In fact, this argument misses the crucial point, namely that the small perturbation, which gives the Hamiltonian of the internal structure a time dependence, through the appearance of X cm (t), is not at all negligible. To illustrate this let us imagine that the wave function at rest has the HartreeFock form, an anti-symmetrized product of one body wave functions ψ i (x i ), and let us characterize the external potential by a strength ǫ. As a consequence of the perturbation, each one body wave function will be perturbed, and its overlap with the original one body wave function will be less than one. It follows that the overlap between the perturbed and unperturbed multi-body wave functions will be of order (1−ǫ) N . This has the exponential suppression we claimed, as long as ǫ ≫ 1 N . It is easy to see that a similar suppression obtains for matrix elements of few body operators. One can argue that a similar suppression is obtained for generalized Jastrow wave functions, with only few body correlations, but a more general and convincing argument based on quantum field theory will be given in the next section. Here we will follow through the consequences of this exponential suppression.
The effect is to break up the full Hilbert space of the composite object in the external potential, into approximate super-selection sectors labeled by macroscopically different classical trajectories X cm (t) (microscopically different trajectories correspond to ǫ ∼ 1 N ). Local measurements cannot detect interference effects between states in different super-selection sectors on times scales shorter than e 10 20 (following Huang, we leave off the obviously irrelevant unit of time). That is to say, for all in principle purposes, a superposition of states corresponding to different classical trajectories behaves like a classi-cal probability distribution for classical trajectories. The difference of course is that in classical statistical physics one avers that in principle one could measure the initial conditions precisely, whereas in quantum mechanics the uncertainty is intrinsic to the formalism.
I have used the phrase in principle in two different ways in the previous paragraph. The first use was ironic; the natural phrase that comes to mind is for all practical purposes. I replace in practice by in principle in order to emphasize that any conceivable experiment that could distinguish between the classical probability distribution and the quantum predictions would have to keep the system isolated over times inconceivably longer than the age of the universe. In other words, it is meaningless for a physicist to consider the two calculations different from each other. In yet another set of words; the phrase "With enough effort, one can in principle measure the quantum correlations in a superposition of macroscopically different states", has the same status as the phrase "If wishes were horses then beggars would ride".
The second use of in principle was the conventional philosophical one: the mathematical formalism of classical statistical mechanics contemplates arbitrarily precise measurements, on which we superimpose a probability distribution which we interpret to be a measure of our ignorance. In fact, even in classical mechanics for a system whose entropy is order 10 20 , this is arrant nonsense. The measurement of the precise state of such a system would again take inconceivably longer than the age of the universe.
This comparison is useful because it emphasizes the fact that the tiny matrix elements between super-selection sectors are due to an entropic effect. They are small because a change in the trajectory of the center of mass changes the state of a huge number of degrees of freedom. Indeed, in a very rough manner, one can say that the time necessary to see quantum interference effects between two macroscopically different states is of order the Poincare recurrence time of the system. This is very rough, because there is no argument that the order 1 factors in the exponent are the same, so the actual numbers could be vastly different. The important point is that for truly macroscopic systems both times are super-exponentially longer than the age of the universe.
The center of mass is one of a large number of collective or thermodynamic observables of a typical macroscopic system found in the laboratory. The number of such variables is a measure of the number of macroscopic moving parts of the system. As we will see, a system with a goodly supply of such moving parts is a good measuring device. Indeed, the application of the foregoing remarks to the quantum measurement problem is immediate. As von Neumann first remarked, there is absolutely no problem in arranging a unitary transformation which maps the state
of a microsystem uncorrelated with the |Ready state of a measuring apparatus, into the correlated state
where | + /− > are pointer states of the measuring apparatus. If we simply assume, in accordance with experience, that the labels +/− characterize the value of a macroscopic observable in the sense described above, then we can immediately come to the following conclusions
• The quantum interference between the two pieces of the wave function cannot be measured on time scales shorter than the super-exponential times described above. The predictions of quantum mechanics for this state are identical in principle (first usage) to the predictions of a classical theory that tells us only the probabilities of the machine reading + or −. Like any such probabilistic theory the algorithm for interpreting its predictions is to condition the future predictions on any actual measurements made at intermediate times. This is the famous "collapse of the wave function", on which so much fatuous prose has been expended. It no more violates conservation of probability than does throwing out those weather simulations, which predicted that Hurricane Katrina would hit Galveston.
• One may worry that there is a violation of unitarity in this description, because if I apply the same unitary transformation to the states | ↑ ⊗|Ready and | ↓ ⊗|Ready , individually, then I get a pair of states whose overlap is not small. This seems like a violation of the superposition principle, but this mathematical exercise has nothing to do with physics, for at least two reasons. First the macro-states labeled by +/− are not single states, but huge ensembles, with e N members. The typical member of any of these ensembles is a time dependent state with the property that time averages of observables over a short relaxation time are identical to those in another member of the ensemble. The chances of starting with the identical |Ready state or ending with the same | + /− states in two experiments with different initial micro-states, is e −N . Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, the experimenter who designs equipment to amplify microscopic signals into macroscopic pointer readings, does not control the microscopic interaction between the atoms in the measuring device and e.g. the electron whose spin is being measured. Thus, in effect, every time we do a new measurement, whether with the same input micro-state or a different one, it is virtually certain that the unitary transformation that is actually performed on the system is a different one.
For me, these considerations resolve all the angst associated with the Schrödinger's cat paradox. Figurative superpositions of live and dead cats occur every day, whenever a macroscopic event is triggered by a micro-event. We see nothing remarkable about them because quantum mechanics makes no remarkable predictions about them. It never says "the cat is both alive and dead", but rather, "I can't predict whether the cat is alive or dead, only the probability that you will find it alive or dead if you do the same experiment over and over". Wave function collapse and the associated claims of instantaneous action at a distance are really nothing but the the familiar classical procedure of discarding those parts of a probabilistic prediction, which are disproved by actual experiments. This is usually called the use of conditional probabilities, and no intellectual discomfort is attached to it.
We are left with the discomfort Einstein expressed in his famous aphorism about mythical beings rolling dice. Those of us who routinely think about the application of quantum mechanics to the entire universe, as in the apparently successful inflationary prediction of the nature of Cosmic Microwave Background temperature fluctuations, cannot even find comfort in the frequentist's fairy tale about defining probability "objectively" by doing an infinite number of experiments. Probability is a guess, a bet about the future. What is it doing in the most precisely defined of sciences? I will leave this question for each of my readers to ponder in solitude. I certainly don't know the answer.
Finally, I want to return to the spread of the wave packet for the center of mass, and what it means from the point of view presented here. It is clear that the uncertainties described by this wave function can all be attributed to the inevitable quantum uncertainties in the initial conditions for the position and velocity of this variable. Quantum mechanics prevents us from isolating the initial phase space point with absolute precision. For free particles or harmonic potentials, these can simply be viewed (via the Wigner distribution) as microscopic initial uncertainties in the classical trajectory X cm (t). For other potentials there are small corrections to this, proportional to inverse powers of N ∼ 10 20 , since the Wigner distribution no longer satisfies the classical Liouville equation. If we wait long enough these uncertainties would, from a purely classical point of view, lead to macroscopic deviations of the position from that predicted by the classical trajectory we have expanded around. The correct interpretation of this is that our approximation breaks down over such long time scales. A better approximation would be to decide that after a time long enough for an initial microscopic deviation to evolve into a macroscopic one, we must redefine our super-selection sectors. After this time, matrix elements between classical trajectories that were originally part of the same super-selection sector, become so small that we must declare that they are different sectors.
Thus instead of, in another famous Einsteinian phrase, complaining that the moon is predicted to disappear when we don't look at it (over a time scale power law in its mass), we say that quantum mechanics predicts that our best measurement of the initial position and velocity of the moon is imprecise. The initial uncertainties are small, but grow with time, to the extent that eventually we cannot predict exactly where the moon is. Quantum mechanics does predict, that the moon has followed some (to a very good approximation) classical trajectory, but does not allow us to say which one, a long time after an initial measurement of the position and velocity.
2 Quantum field theory I will describe the considerations of this section in the language of relativistic quantum field theory. A fortiori they apply to the non-relativistic limit, which we discussed in first quantization in the previous section. They also apply to cutoff field theories, with some kind of spatial cutoff, like a space lattice. The key property of all these systems is that the degrees of freedom are labeled by points in a fixed spatial geometry, with a finite number of canonical bosonic or fermionic variables per point. The Hamiltonian of these degrees of freedom is a sum of terms, each of which only couples together the points within a finite radius 3 In the relativistic case of course the Hamiltonian is an integral of a strictly local Hamiltonian density.
Let us first discuss the ground state of such a system. If the theory has a mass gap, then the ground state expectation values of products of local operators fall off exponentially beyond some correlation length L c . If d is the spatial dimension of the system,and V is a volume ≫ L as the normalized state with minimum expectation value of the Hamiltonian, subject to the constraint that
One can show, using the assumption of a finite correlation length, that these states have the following properties
• The quantum dynamics of the variable Φ c is amenable to the semiclassical approximation, with expansion parameter ∝ 1/v.
• The matrix elements of local operators between states with different values of φ c satisfy
where n is kept finite as v → ∞.
• The interference terms in superpositions between states with different values of Φ c remain small for times of order e bv . This follows from the previous remark and the fact that the Hamiltonian is an integral of local operators. This remark is proved by thinking about which term in the t-expansion of e −iHt first links together the different superposition sectors with an amplitude of order 1. There is a technical problem in this argument, because the Hamiltonian is unbounded, but it is intuitively clear that a cutoff at high energy should not affect the infrared considerations here.
In the language of the previous section, averages of local fields over distances large compared to the correlation length are good pointer observables.
To define an actual apparatus, we have to assume that the quantum field theory admits bound states of arbitrarily large size. Typically this might require us to add chemical potential terms to the Hamiltonian and insist on macroscopically large expectation values for some conserved charge. The canonical example would be a large, but finite, volume drop of nuclear matter in QCD. We can repeat the discussion above for averages over sub-volumes of the droplet.
Of course, in the real world, the assumption of a microscopically small correlation length is not valid, because of electromagnetic and gravitational forces. Indeed, most real measuring devices use these long range forces, both to stabilize the bound state and for the operation of the machine itself. I do not know how to provide a mathematical proof, but I am confident that the properties described above survive without qualitative modification 4 . This is probably because all the long range quantum correlations are summarized by the classical electromagnetic and gravitational interactions between parts of the system 5 . It would be desirable to have a better understanding of the modification of the arguments given here, which is necessary to incorporate the effects of electromagnetism and (perturbative) gravitation. One may also conclude from this discussion that a system at a quantum critical point, which has long range correlations not attributable to electromagnetism or gravitation, would make a poor measuring device, and might be the best candidate for seeing quantum interference between "macroscopic objects". Of course, such conformally invariant systems do not have large bound states which could serve as candidate "macroscopic objects".
Despite the mention of gravitation in the previous paragraph, the above remarks do not apply to regimes in which the correct theory of quantum gravity is necessary for a correct description of nature. We are far from a complete understanding of a quantum theory of gravity, but this author believes that it is definitely not a quantum field theory. I will give a necessarily idiosyncratic discussion of quantum gravity in the next section. The reader who wishes to skip that section will not lose anything essential to his understanding of the general principles of quantum theory.
Towards a quantum theory of gravitation
This is not the place to recapitulate all I have written about the quantum theory of gravitation. Readers who are interested can consult [1] . Instead, I will just assert certain differences between my vision of the theory, and ordinary quantum field theory. In quantum field theory, one assumes a fixed Lorentzian space-time background, and the algebra of observables describing the results of measurements in a given causal diamond 6 , is infinite dimensional and becomes universal as the diamond is taken smaller and smaller. This is a fancy way of saying that all quantum field theories are scale invariant at short distance.
The covariant entropy bound [2] is a conjectural bound on the entropy associated with a causal diamond in the theory of quantum gravity. It says that the entropy is bounded by one quarter of the area in Planck units, of the maximal area d − 2 surface on the null boundary of the diamond. This maximal area surface is called the holographic screen of the causal diamond. The covariant entropy bound can be "derived" in a semi-classical manner by assuming a connection between entropy density and energy density. Fischler and I [4] proposed that this connection between geometry and entropy be taken as the fundamental constructive principle of quantum gravity. The only universally defined density matrix for a quantum system, which, like quantum field theory in a generic space-time, does not necessarily have a conserved Hamiltonian,is the maximally uncertain one. We thus proposed that the quantum definition of a causal diamond is a Hilbert space of fixed size. The causal relations between different diamonds are fixed by specifying which tensor factors in the algebra of observables in each diamond, should be identified as operators which can be measured by observers in both diamonds. We presented a tentative set of axioms for such a quantum space-time [1] .
For the present purposes, the most important feature of this formalism is the (only partially understood) manner in which it reduces to quantum field theory, and its description of high entropy states which are not approximated by quantum field theory. Very roughly speaking, the variables describing physics in a causal diamond can be described by first specifying the "algebra of functions on the holographic screen". This is a finite dimensional matrix algebra, with a basis consisting of N elements. When N → ∞ the area of the screen goes to infinity and the algebra converges to the usual infinite dimensional commutative algebra of functions. A basis element f n of the algebra is called a pixel. The variables of the quantum theory form an operator algebra ⊗ P A, where the single pixel algebra A is a finite dimensional operator algebra 7 . In less formal language, we pixelate the holographic screen and have an independent algebra of quantum variables for each pixel.
The quantum variables then are matrices O j i , where for each element i, j, O is a member of A. The precise algebra of matrices is determined by the requirement that the sequence of algebras converge to the correct continuum function algebra as N → ∞. Particles arise in this formalism when, for dynamical reasons, the variables associated with a commuting set of matrices, are approximately dynamically independent of the rest. The usual permutation gauge symmetry relating commuting matrices to block diagonal matrices is interpreted as particle statistics. There is a natural way [5] that the geometry of a holographic screen produces variables describing supersymmetric particles. As in Matrix Theory [3] , the size of individual block matrices is related to the total momentum of particles in the direction perpendicular to the holographic screen. We will call this radial momentum. The natural basis for particle kinematics is to describe each particle by an angular position on the screen and the momentum perpendicular to the screen. This should be familiar to experimental particle physicists.
Without going into details, two features of this formalism are noteworthy:
• In a finite causal diamond, the number of particles is bounded, in a way that depends on their momenta.
• If we try to use all of the variables in a finite causal diamond, we inevitably have non-commuting matrices, and we lose the particle interpretation of the Hilbert space. This failure occurs as we try to construct states which maximize the entropy 8 . A further assumption of the formalism is that the Hamiltonian for these maximal entropy states is a highly degenerate one with a random spectrum. This ensures that our model reproduces the thermodynamics of black holes.
To make a long and incomplete story short, the aim of this formalism is to show that the theory of quantum gravity contains states consisting of multiple particles, under conditions in which the particles do not collapse to form black holes, as well as black hole states, and nothing else 9 . The black hole states have tiny random energy splittings, and behave like an equilibrium ensemble with only a few macroscopic variables. The particle states are well described by field theory and, for appropriate choices of field theory 10 it will have macroscopic bound states with many macroscopic moving parts. These are excellent approximations to the classical measuring devices used in formulating the axioms of quantum mechanics, as has been shown above. Black holes are terrible measuring devices, they can only register changes in a few macroscopic variables, like mass charge and angular momentum.
Conclusions
I suspect the material in this paper is well understood by many other physicists, including most of those who have worked on the environmental decoherence approach to quantum measurement [6] . If there is anything at all new in what I have written here about quantum measurement, it lies in the statement that a macroscopic apparatus of modest size serves as its own "environment" for the purpose of environmental decoherence. In normal laboratory circumstances, the apparatus interacts with a much larger environment and the huge recurrence and coherence times become even larger. Nonetheless, there is no reason to suppose that a modestly macroscopic apparatus, surrounded by a huge region of vacuum, with the latter protected from external penetrating radiation by thousands of meters of lead, would behave differently over actual experimental time scales, than an identical piece of machinery in the laboratory.
The essential point in this paper is that the corrections to the classical behavior of macroscopic systems are exponential in the size of the system in microscopic units. This puts observable quantum behavior of these systems in the realm of Poincare recurrence phenomenon, essentially a realm of science fiction rather than of real experimental science. When a prediction of a scientific theory can only be verified by experiments done over times superexponentially longer than the measured age of the universe, one should not be surprised if that prediction is counter-intuitive or "defies ordinary logic".
Quantum mechanics does make predictions for macro-systems which are different than those of deterministic classical physics. Any time a macrosystem is put into correlation with a microscopic variable -and this is the essence of the measurement process -its behavior becomes unpredictable. However, these predictions are indistinguishable from those of classical statistical mechanics, with a probability distribution for initial conditions derived from the quantum mechanics of the micro-system. It is only if we try to interpret this in terms of a classical model of the micro-system that we realize something truly strange is going on. The predictions of quantum mechanics for micro-systems are strange, and defy the ordinary rules of logic. But they do obey a perfectly consistent set of axioms of their own, and we have no real right to expect the world beyond the direct ken of our senses, which had no direct effect on the evolution of our brains, to "make sense" in terms of the rules which were evolved to help us survive in a world of macroscopic objects.
Many physicists, with full understanding of all these issues, will still share Einstein's unease with an intrinsically probabilistic theory of nature. Probability is, especially when applied to non-reproducible phenomena like the universe as a whole, a theory of guessing, and implicitly posits a mind which is doing the guessing. Yet all of modern science seems to point in the direction of mind and consciousness being an emergent phenomenon; a property of large complex systems rather than of the fundamental microscopic laws. The frequentist approach to probability does not really solve this problem. Its precise predictions are only for fictional infinite ensembles of experiments. If, after the millionth toss of a supposedly fair coin has shown us a million heads, and we ask the frequentist if we're being cheated, all he can answer is "probably". Neither can he give us any better than even odds that the next coin will come up tails if the coin toss is truly unbiased.
I have no real answer to this unease, other than "That's life. Get over it." For me the beautiful way in which linear algebra generates a new kind of probability theory, even if we choose to ignore it and declare it illogical 11 , is some solace for being faced with a question to which, perhaps, my intrinsic makeup prevents me from getting an intuitively satisfying answer. On the other hand, I believe that discomfort with an intrinsically probabilistic formulation of fundamental laws is the only "mystery" of quantum mechanics. If someone told me that the fundamental theory of the world was classical mechanics, with a fixed initial probability distribution, I would feel equally uncomfortable. The fact that the laws of probability for micro-systems don't obey our macroscopic "logic" points only to facts about the forces driving the evolution of our brains. If we had needed an intuitive understanding of quantum mechanics to obtain an adaptive advantage over frogs, we, or some other organism, would have developed it. Perhaps we can breed humans who have such an intuitive understanding by making the right to reproduce contingent upon obtaining tenure at a physics department. Verifying the truth of this conjecture would take a long time, but much less than time than it would take to observe quantum correlations in a superposition of macro-states.
